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ABSTRACT
We study interactive proofs with sublinear-time veriﬁers.
These proof systems can be used to ensure approximate cor-
rectness for the results of computations delegated to an un-
trusted server. Following the literature on property testing,
we seek proof systems where with high probability the ver-
iﬁer accepts every input in the language, and rejects every
input that is far from the language. The veriﬁer’s query
complexity (and computation complexity), as well as the
communication, should all be sublinear. We call such a proof
system an Interactive Proof of Proximity (IPP).
• On the positive side, our main result is that all lan-
guages in NC have Interactive Proofs of Proximity
with roughly
√
n query and communication and com-
plexities, and polylog(n) communication rounds.
This is achieved by identifying a natural language,
membership in an aﬃne subspace (for a structured
class of subspaces), that is complete for constructing
interactive proofs of proximity, and providing eﬃcient
protocols for it. In building an IPP for this complete
language, we show a tradeoﬀ between the query and
communication complexity and the number of rounds.
For example, we give a 2-round protocol with roughly
n
3/4 queries and communication.
• On the negative side, we show that there exist nat-
ural languages in NC
1, for which the sum of queries
and communication in any constant-round interactive
proof of proximity must be polynomially related to n.
In particular, for any 2-round protocol, the sum of
queries and communication must be at least ˜ Ω(
√
n).
∗Center for Research on Computation and Society (CRCS)
and School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS),
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA USA. Work done in
part while on leave as a Visiting Researcher at Microsoft
Research SVC and a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University.
Also supported by NSF grant CNS-1237235.
†Research partially supported by NSF grant CCF-0832797.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciﬁc
permission and/or a fee.
STOC’13, June 1-4, 2013, Palo Alto, California, USA.
Copyright 2013 ACM 978-1-4503-2029-0/13/06 ...$15.00.
• Finally, we construct much better IPPs for speciﬁc
functions, such as bipartiteness on random or well-
mixing graphs, and the majority function. The query
complexities of these protocols are provably better (by
exponential or polynomial factors) than what is possi-
ble in the standard property testing model, i.e. with-
out a prover.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2.0 [Theory of Computation]: Analysis of Algorithms
and Problem Complexity—General
Keywords
Interactive Proofs, Sublinear Algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
The power of eﬃciently veriﬁable proof systems is a cen-
tral question in the study of computation. In this work, we
study the power, and the limitations, of interactive proof
systems with very eﬃcient sublinear time veriﬁers.
An interactive proof system [GMR89, BM88] is an inter-
active protocol between a prover and a randomized veriﬁer,
in which the prover convinces the veriﬁer of the validity of
a computational statement. The computational statement
is usually the membership of an input x, known both to
the prover and to the veriﬁer, in a language L. The fa-
mous IP = PSPACE Theorem [LFKN92, Sha92] estab-
lished that interactive proofs with polynomial-time veriﬁers
are remarkably powerful: they can be used to prove any lan-
guage/statement computable in polynomial space. In this
work, we follow the quest for eﬃcient proof veriﬁcation to
its extreme. We ask:
Which computational statements have an interactive proof
that can be veriﬁed in sublinear time?
Since the veriﬁer runs in sublinear time, it cannot even
read the input in its entirety. Following work on sublin-
ear time algorithms and property testing [RS96, GGR98,
EKR04], we consider veriﬁers that have query access to the
input: the input x is treated as an oracle, and on query i
the veriﬁer receives x[i]. Our goal is sublinear veriﬁer run-
ning time, but we also consider the query complexity, the
communication complexity, and the round complexity of the
protocol, as well as the running time of the honest prover:
in diﬀerent settings, queries, communication, and rounds of
interaction may come at diﬀerent costs. We emphasize that,
as in the standard interactive proof model, the veriﬁer’s in-
put is reliable and ﬁxed throughout the protocol, whereasthe prover is unreliable and untrusted, and might deviate
from the protocol in an adaptive and arbitrary manner. We
ﬁnd this to be the most natural model for sublinear-time
proof veriﬁcation, but we also provide some motivating ap-
plications below. Finally, throughout this work we consider
computationally unbounded cheating provers, and make no
cryptographic assumptions.
On reﬂection, it quickly becomes apparent that there exist
simple and natural languages, for which membership cannot
be veriﬁed in sublinear time. For example, there is no way
for a prover to convince the veriﬁer that the parity of a
string is 0, unless the veriﬁer reads the entire string. Thus,
drawing further inspiration from property testing, we relax
the requirement: the veriﬁer should still accept inputs in
the language, but it is only required to reject (with high
probability) inputs that are far from the language, say at
(fractional) Hamming distance at least ε ∈ (0,1) from every
input in the language.
1 We call such a protocol an Interac-
tive Proof of ε-Proximity. We deﬁne and study a new com-
plexity class: IPP, the class of languages that have inter-
active proofs of proximity with sublinear-time veriﬁcation.
See Section 2 for formal deﬁnitions of these proof systems
and the complexity class IPP (parameterized with the dis-
tance, query, communication and round complexities). For
clarity, throughout the introduction we often ignore many of
the proof system parameters. In particular, we refer loosely
to the complexity class IPP as the class of languages that
have Interactive Proofs of ε-Proximity, with sublinear query
and communication complexities, for some non-trivial ε.
A Motivating Application: Delegating Computation
in Sublinear Time. In addition to being a foundational
issue in the theory of computation, proof veriﬁcation is also
motivated by real-world applications, such as delegating com-
putation: a powerful server can run a computation for a
weaker client, and provide an interactive proof of the out-
put’s correctness [GKR08]. The study of Interactive Proofs
of Proximity with sublinear time veriﬁcation is also moti-
vated by such applications: namely, delegating computation
in sublinear time. Consider a client that has reliable query
access to an input x, but is very computationally restricted:
it can only run in sublinear time. Still, this client wants to
approximate a function f on x. A more powerful server can
also access x, and can run in polynomial time, but it might
cheat. The server can compute y = f(x) and send it to
the client. The client receives some (potentially incorrect)
output y
′, and can use a sublinear time Interactive Proof of
Proximity to verify that y
′ is “not too far” from f(x). By
“not too far” here, we mean that there exists some x
′ at
Hamming distance ε from x s.t. y
′ = f(x
′). Thus, even a
sublinear time client can reliably delegate its computations,
and verify the approximate accuracy of answers.
We emphasize again that we assume that the client’s ac-
cess to the input x is reliable: x is ﬁxed in advance, or at
the very least x does not change adaptively depending on
the client’s random coins. On the other hand, we assume
nothing about the untrusted prover’s behavior: it might
cheat arbitrarily and adaptively, and it is not computation-
ally bounded. The assumption that x is reliable warrants
further discussion and motivation. For example, x might be
1More generally, one could think of other distance measures
or norms, as done in [EKR04]. We will (mostly) focus our
attention on fractional Hamming distance throughout this
work.
a large dataset that both the client and the server can access
(e.g. the Twitter graph). Alternatively, x might be real-time
data that can be reliably measured by both the client and
the server, e.g. network traﬃc or climate data. The client
might only have the resources to measure (and store) x at a
few points in time.
2 Finally, we note that even if the client’s
input is stored on an untrusted server, a memory checker
[BEG
+94] could be combined with an Interactive Proof of
Proximity. The memory checker would detect any cheating
on the client’s queries to the input. Known constructions
of memory checkers would maintain information-theoretic
security, at only a sublinear communication overhead.
Comparison with Prior Work on Sublinear Time
Computation and Veriﬁcation. A rich body of work
within the literature on sublinear-time algorithms focuses
on property testing [RS96, GGR98]. There, a randomized
tester has query access to the input, and needs to distinguish
whether the input is in a language or far from the language.
See also [Gol10b] and the excellent survey in [Ron09]. We
extend this model by also providing interaction with a more
powerful prover, who can read the input in its entirety, but
might cheat. Of course, we assume more here than what is
needed for standard property testing: namely, the existence
of such a prover. However, we leverage this assumption to
obtain more powerful and general results than what is pos-
sible in the property testing model. Most signiﬁcantly, we
tackle an inherent limitation of property testing: research on
property testing has focused on constructing testers for lan-
guages based on their combinatorial or algebraic structure.
This limitation seems inherent, because there exist simple
and natural languages for which (provably) no sublinear
time property testers exist (e.g. parity, see also [GKNR12]).
In contrast, looking ahead, we show that IPPs allow general
results for a rich class of computations. Further, we will
show that even for speciﬁc problems, interaction with an
untrusted prover can give a (provable) exponential improve-
ment in query complexity compared to what is possible in
property testing without a prover (even with only a single
round of interaction and logarithmic communication).
Another beautiful line of research, starting with the work
of Babai et al. on Holographic Proofs [BFLS91], has focused
on “PCP-like” proof systems with sublinear-time veriﬁers.
They constructed such proof systems under the assumption
that the input is given in encoded form. Ergun, Kumar and
Rubinfeld [EKR04] constructed PCP-like proofs for several
natural languages. The work of Ben-Sasson et al. on PCPs
of Proximity [BGH
+06], and the work of Dinur and Reingold
on Assignment Testers [DR06], give general constructions
using PCP machinery. These works can be viewed as extend-
ing the property testing model by giving the veriﬁer query
access to a ﬁxed proof string. While that proof string may
be wrong, it is nonetheless ﬁxed and does not change with
veriﬁer’s queries to it. In our model (and in the delegating
computation motivation) the prover can adaptively change
its strategy and answers, as a function of subsequent veri-
ﬁer’s messages. As discussed in [GKR08], handling adaptive
cheating provers is essential for applications to delegating
2In this scenario, the protocol might only be run later, af-
ter the real-time data has been observed. When this is the
case, we may want an Interactive Proof where the veriﬁer’s
queries can be made ahead of time, and are independent of
the prover’s messages. The veriﬁers in all of our protocols
have this “oblivious query” property.computation, and“PCP-like”proof systems are not directly
suited for these applications. Further, this diﬀerence in the
power of the cheating prover is driven home by the fact that
in the standard setting, with polynomial time veriﬁers, the
setting of a ﬁxed proof string gives rise to the class MIP
[BGKW88], and allows veriﬁcation of languages in NEXP
[BFL91], whereas the setting of an adaptive prover gives rise
to the class IP [GMR89, BM88], and allows only veriﬁcation
of languages in PSPACE [LFKN92, Sha92]. Thus, we ex-
pect to be able to prove less than in the “PCP-like” setting,
and indeed prove lower bounds to that eﬀect.
The conference version of [EKR04] also studied interactive
proofs with sublinear-time veriﬁers, and provided protocols
for speciﬁc functions such as element distinctness.
1.1 The Power of IPP
In this section we outline our positive results. First, we
show a general result, Theorem 1.1 below: every language
computable by circuits of low depth,
3 has a sublinear-time
Interactive Proof of Proximity. To prove this general result
we identify a “complete problem” for constructing Interac-
tive Proofs of Proximity: testing proximity to an aﬃne sub-
space (form a structured class having to do with polynomial
interpolation, see below). We provide an IPP for the com-
plete problem, and then use completeness to derive IPPs for
low-depth languages. In addition, we also mention our re-
sults for speciﬁc languages: IPPs for testing bipartiteness in
the bounded degree model, and for testing Hamming weight.
We ﬁnd constructions for speciﬁc languages to be interesting
even given the general result in Theorem 1.1. First, these
constructions improve the communication and round com-
plexities obtained there. The improvements can be quite
dramatic: for bipartiteness we obtain a provable exponen-
tial improvement in the query complexity needed for IPPs
compared with standard property testing (without a prover).
Moreover, even if the communication or round complexities
are not improved, construction for speciﬁc languages avoid
the overhead induced by the completeness reduction.
IPPs for Low-Depth Computation. We show a general
result for low-depth computations:
Theorem 1.1 (Depth(n
γ) ⊆ IPP). For every language
L computable by log-space uniform circuits of depth D =
D(n), size S = S(n) and fan-in 2, and every distance ε =
ε(n),
4 there exists an Interactive Proof of ε-Proximity for L.
The proof has perfect completeness and soundness error
1/2. For an input of length n, the query complexity is (1/ε)
1+o(1),
the communication complexity is (ε · n · (1/ε)
o(1) · poly(D)),
and the number of rounds is O(logn+D·logS). The honest
Prover P runs in time poly(S), and the veriﬁer V runs in
time O(((1/ε) + (ε · n))
1+o(1) · poly(D) · logS).
See Section 3 and the full version for further details. We
note that Theorem 1.1 gives sublinear-copmlexity IPPs even
for very small values of ε,
5 e.g. for ε = 1/n
1−δ for any con-
stant δ > 0. In interpreting this result, one useful setting
3Throughout, when we say a language is computable in“low
depth” or Depth(n
γ), we mean that it can be computed by
a log-space uniform family of Boolean circuit with fan-in 2
and depth O(n
γ), for a universal constant γ > 0.
4Here and throughout, we assume that all complexity and
distance parameters such as D(n), S(n), ε(n) are com-
putable in space O(logn).
5The smaller ε is, the “harder” it is to prove ε-proximity.
to consider is that of an NC language (computable in depth
D(n) = polylog(n) and size S(n) = poly(n)). Here Theorem
1.1 gives a tradeoﬀ between the query complexity q and com-
munication complexity c, where q×c = n
1+o(1). The number
of rounds is poly-logarithmic, and the honest prover runs in
polynomial time. In particular, for any ε(n) ≥ n
−1/2, the
queries, communication, and veriﬁer runtime can all be be
n
1/2+o(1). This applies to varied problems in NC: for exam-
ple, graph functions such as planarity testing, connectivity,
ﬁnding a perfect matching, or algebraic problems such as
computing matrix rank..
Remark 1.2 (Nearly-Optimal Query Complexity).
In general, query complexity Ω(1/ε) is essential for IPPs: a
cheating prover can always choose x ∈ L and ﬂip (ε·n) uni-
formly random coordinates. Suppose that w.h.p this gives x
′
that is ε-far from L (e.g. L is an error-correcting code, so no
two strings in L are close). When running the protocol on
x
′, the cheating prover can follow the honest prover’s strat-
egy for input x, and unless the veriﬁer queries one of the
coordinates on which x and x
′ diﬀer it will accept (by com-
pleteness). Since x and x
′ diﬀer only on (ε · n) uniformly
random coordinates, the veriﬁer must make Ω(1/ε) queries
in order to reject x
′ (as needed for soundness).
A “Complete” Problem: Testing Membership in an
Aﬃne Subspace. For input length n, an integer t ≪ n,
and a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, an aﬃne subspace is speciﬁed by a ma-
trix A ∈ F
t×n and a “target” vector v ∈ F
t. The language
AﬃneMem(A,v), of checking membership in the aﬃne sub-
space deﬁned by A and v, is the set of inputs x ∈ F
n for
which A·x = v.
6 An IPP for AﬃneMem allows a veriﬁer to
check whether its input x ∈ F
n is close to a vector x
′ ∈ F
n
such that A·x
′ = v, using only a sublinear (in n) number of
queries to x, and sublinear communication. Looking ahead,
we will focus on testing membership in a speciﬁc structured
family of aﬃne subspaces. In particular, the matrix A will
have a succinct representation. See further details below.
We provide a reduction, via an interactive protocol, from
proving proximity to any language L computable in low
depth, to proving proximity to AﬃneMem (for a restricted
class of matrices A). This reduction uses the “Interactive
Proofs for Muggles” of [GKR08] (see Section 3).
Theorem 1.3 (Informal; AﬃneMem is \complete").
For every distance bound ε = ε(n), and every language L
computable by log-space uniform boolean circuits of depth
D = D(n), size S = S(n), and fan-in 2, for t = t(n) =
O(ε · n · logn) and a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, there exists an interac-
tive protocol between a prover and a veriﬁer as follows. On
input x, the output is (an implicit description of) a matrix
A ∈ F
t×n and an (explicit) vector v ∈ F
t, such that:
• Completeness. If x ∈ L and the prover honestly follows
the protocol, then x ∈ AﬃneMem(A,v).
• Soundness. If x is ε-far from L, then for any cheating
prover, with all but 1/2 probability over the veriﬁer’s
coins, x is also ε-far from AﬃneMem(A,v).
In particular an Interactive Proof of ε-Proximity, is also an
interactive proof of ε
′-proximity for any ε
′ ≥ ε.
6Or rather, the language is speciﬁed by an ensemble of ma-
trices and target vectors, one for each input length.The prover runs in time poly(S), and the veriﬁer runs
in time ε · n · poly(D). The communication complexity is
ε·n·poly(D), and the number of rounds is O(D·logS). The
veriﬁer makes no queries to the input x during the protocol.
As noted above, we focus our attention on a structured
variant of AﬃneMem, the problem PVAL of evaluating (or
interpolating) bounded-degree multivariate polynomials. In
fact, the formal statement of Theorem 1.3 shows complete-
ness for this structured variant, and we use the additional
structure to directly construct an IPP for PVAL. This, in
turn, yields (via completeness) an IPP for any low-depth lan-
guage, and in particular also for the more general AﬃneMem
problem (where the matrix A has any implicit representation
computable in low depth).
The problem PVAL is deﬁned as follows. Each input x
speciﬁes a multivariate bounded-degree polynomial Px over
a ﬁeld F. An aﬃne subspace is now deﬁned by a size-t set
J ⊆ F
m of“evaluation points”, and a“target”vector v ∈ F
t
of values. The language PVAL(J,v) is the set of inputs x
s.t. ∀j ∈ J,Px(j) = v[j] (where v[j] denotes entry of v
corresponding to item j).
7 One diﬀerence from the more
general AﬃneMem problem, is that here the (large) matrix
A (of size t·n) is implicitly speciﬁed by the set J (of size t).
In more detail: the input x speciﬁes the polynomial Px as
a list of its evaluations on a canonical subset S ⊆ F
m (we
call these the “interpolation points”). E.g., for polynomials
of degree less than k in each variable, we can take S =
H
m for any ﬁxed H ⊆ F of size k (usually F will be an
extension ﬁeld of H). Taking n = k
m, the input x gives
an evaluation for each interpolation point, yielding a unique
polynomial Px of degree less than k in each variable that
agrees with these evaluations. For any point j ∈ F
m and
a “target value” v[j] ∈ F, the constraint Px(j) = v[j] is a
linear constraint over Px’s evaluations on the interpolation
points (using the linearity of polynomial interpolation). I.e.,
we can express this constraint as Aj · x = v[j], where Aj ∈
F
n is a (ﬁxed) function of j. The language PVAL(J,v) is
exactly AﬃneMem(AJ,v), where for each j ∈ J the matrix
AJ includes the row Aj deﬁned above.
An IPP for PVAL. The goal of a sublinear veriﬁer for
PVAL, is to determine whether the given evaluations of the
polynomial on evaluation points in J are correct, while only
reading a sublinear number of interpolation points. We note
that the polynomial’s evaluation on each point in J might
well depend on most (if not all) of the evaluations on inter-
polation points. Thus, the veriﬁer cannot (on its own) verify
any of the claimed evaluations on J without reading Ω(n)
coordinates of x. Moreover, for natural choices of J and v
the distribution generated by drawing a uniformly random
input x ← PVAL(J,v) can be Ω(n)-wise independent: In
particular, for any n/10 queries made by the veriﬁer into the
input, the values it sees are uniformly random. A uniformly
random input, however, is (1/10)-far from PVAL(J,v) with
all but negligible probability. We are asking the veriﬁer to
distinguish these two distributions using a sublinear number
of queries! Indeed, this is impossible in the standard prop-
erty testing model (without a prover), because the veriﬁer
should accept a random input in the language, and reject a
7To be more precise, PVAL is an inﬁnite ensemble of ﬁnite
languages indexed by the ﬁeld F, the number of variables,
the degree bound, the subset J of points, and the vector v
of values on J.
uniformly random input, but its views of the input in both
cases are statistically close.
In the presence of a prover, however, we can overcome
these diﬃculties, and construct an Interactive Proof of Prox-
imity for PVAL.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal; IPP for PVAL). For every
n ∈ N and ε > 0, for J,v,F,k,m as generated in the reduc-
tion of Theorem 1.3, there exists an ε-IPP for PVAL(J,v).
The IPP has perfect completeness, soundness 1/2, query
complexity (1/ε)
1+o(1), and O(log(1/ε)) rounds. The com-
munication complexity is ε · n · (1/ε)
o(1), and the veriﬁer
runtime is ((1/ε) + ε · n)
1+o(1). The honest prover runtime
is poly(n).
More generally, we get a tradeoﬀ between the commu-
nication complexity and round complexity. The theorem
statement above is one extreme of this tradeoﬀ (optimized
for small communication). We can also optimize for the
round complexity, and obtain a 3-message protocol with √
ε · n · (1/ε)
o(1) communication. See Corollaries 3.2 and
3.3 in Section 3 for formal statements.
Remark 1.5. We emphasize that the IPP setting is dif-
ferent from the setting of local testing or decoding, and from
the setting of PCP-like proofs, in that a malicious prover can
be completely adaptive in its cheating. Thus, it is not obvious
how to use the strong local testing and decoding properties of
polynomials. In particular, one initial approach might be to
have the prover perform polynomial evaluations for the ver-
iﬁer, and use local testing/decoding to detect cheating, as is
done throughout the PCP literature and (in particular) in the
work of [BGH
+06]. The diﬃculty with this approach, is that
local testing and decoding procedures are only sound against
non-adaptive (static) corruptions, and are easily fooled by
adaptive corruptions.
A Taste of Techniques. We proceed with intuition for the
proof of Theorem 1.4. Consider the case where the input x
speciﬁes a 2-variate polynomial Px(i1,i2) of degree less than
k =
√
n in each variable. x includes the evaluations of Px on
all the speciﬁcation points H
2, where H ⊆ F is of size
√
n.
We can “break up” Px(i1,i2) into H univariate polynomials
{Qi1(i2) = Px(i1,i2)}i1∈H. Each univariate Qi1 is speciﬁed
by
√
n bits of the input. Moreover, for any j = (j1,j2) ∈ F,
we can use polynomial interpolation to express Px(j) as a
linear combination of {Qi1(j2)}i1∈H, where the coeﬃcients
in the linear combination depend only on j1.
With this view in mind, consider an evaluation point j =
(j1,j2) ∈ J. The prover claims that Px(j) = v[j]. In the
IPP, for each j ∈ J, the prover sends
√
n (alleged) values
{Qi1(j2)}i1∈H. The veriﬁer checks (via polynomial inter-
polation, as above), that these values are consistent with
the “j-th claim” Px(j) = v[j]. If the j-th claim was false,
and the values are consistent with it, then there must be
some i1 ∈ H for which the prover sent a false value vi1,j2
for Qi1(j2). We have gone from |J| claims about the “large
polynomial”Px (speciﬁed by n variables), to |J|·
√
n claims
about
√
n“small polynomials”{Qi1}i1∈H. While each small
claim depends only on
√
n input bits, it is not clear whether
we have made any progress: verifying all of the new claims
still requires reading every bit of the input x.
Suppose, however, that the prover has been careless in its
cheating: in particular, for each j = (j1,j2) ∈ J, the proverlies about the value of Qi1(j2) for a diﬀerent i1 ∈ H. In
this case, the veriﬁer can pick a uniformly random i1 ∈ H,
and check all |J| claims on Qi1. Observe that this only re-
quires reading
√
n input bits of x: the evaluations of Px on
points in {i1} × H. Since we assumed (with loss of general-
ity) that for |J| of the choices of i1 there exists some claim
on Qi1 where the prover is cheating, the veriﬁer will catch
the prover with probability |J|/|H|. This would already im-
ply an IPP with sublinear complexity (for the appropriate
choice of |J|). The main challenge is that a cheating prover
need not be so careless—in particular, the prover may focus
all of its false claims on a single small polynomial Qi1. In
this case, the veriﬁer cannot detect the cheating by testing
randomly chosen Q’s. This is the main technical challenge
for constructing a non-trivial IPP. Our ﬁrst observation is
that, in this case, Qi1 is “far from” the prover’s claims: the √
n input bits that specify Qi1 are very far from any
√
n bits
that specify a polynomial Q
′
i1 that agrees with the prover’s
claims. In the IPP, the veriﬁer combines the prover’s claims
about the diﬀerent Q’s by taking a random linear combina-
tion of them ˆ Q =
∑
i1∈H αi1 · Qi1. This induces |J| new
claims about the values of ˆ Q at |J| points in F. We show
that if there is a Qi1 that is “far from” the prover’s claims,
then, with high probability over the linear combination, the
new polynomial ˆ Q will be “far from” the induced claims.
This is shown using a new lemma about distances between
linear subspaces, which may be of independent interest:
Lemma 1.6. Let S and T be two linear subspaces of F
n
(for any ﬁnite ﬁeld F and n ∈ N). Suppose that there exists
some point s ∈ S such that s is at (fractional) Hamming
distance at least ε from T (i.e., at Hamming distance at
least ε from every t ∈ T).
Then, with all but 1/(|F| − 1) probability over the choice
of a uniformly random point r ∈R S, the distance between r
and T is at least ε/2.
Omitting many non-trivial details, the ﬁnal step in the
IPP is for the veriﬁer to check consistency of the induced
claims about ˆ Q viz a viz the input x. We show that this can
be done using sublinear query and communication complex-
ities. Note that the above was all for the case of 2-variate
polynomials, and required only a constant number of rounds.
In the full protocol we can handle m-variate polynomials by
composing a protocol based on these ideas to repeatedly re-
duce the number of variables (using O(m) rounds of commu-
nication). We conclude the technical overview by remarking
that the protocol for PVAL can be generalized to a natural
problem of evaluating tensor powers of a linear code. We
take this more general view throughout Section 3 and in the
full version.In this we follow, and are inspired by, the work
of Meir [Mei10], who illuminated the central role of ten-
sor codes in the construction of standard interactive proofs.
Here too, tensors of linear codes play an essential role in
constructing interactive proofs of proximity. See Section 3
and the full version for further details.
1.1.1 IPPs for Speciﬁc Languages
We now move to speciﬁc languages, for which we provide
tailored IPPs that are more eﬃcient (and simple) than the
general construction of Theorem 1.1.
An IPP for Graph Bipartiteness. We construct an In-
teractive Proof of proximity for bipartiteness on random or
well-mixing graphs in the bounded degree model (see e.g.
[Gol10a]). The protocol accepts every bipartite graph. For
a random graph of bounded degree, or for any graph that is
both far from bipartite and well mixing, the veriﬁer will
reject with high probability. That is, this is a protocol
for a promise problem, where YES instances are bipartite,
and NO instances are far from bipartite and well-mixing
(thus a random bounded-degree graph will be a NO instance
with high probability). For constant distance parameter
ε = Θ(1), the protocol has O(logn) query and communi-
cation complexities, and only a single round of communica-
tion. This is a particularly sharp illustration of the beneﬁts
of interaction with a prover, as Goldreich and Ron [GR02]
proved a Ω(
√
n) lower bound on the query complexity of
any property tester for this problem (i.e. without the help
of a prover). The IPP uses ideas from Goldreich and Ron
[GR99], but leverages the presence of a prover to obtain
(provably) an exponential improvement in the query com-
plexity (using only a single round of interaction, and log-
arithmic communication). An interesting open problem is
extending this IPP to apply to all graphs (not just rapidly-
mixing ones), as was done by [GR99] in the standard prop-
erty testing model (they build a ˜ O(
√
n)-query tester for all
graphs). See the full version for details.
An IPP for Majority/Hamming Weight. We also con-
sider the language Hamming(w), of vectors in {0,1}
n with
Hamming weight w. We give a direct Interactive Proof of
ε-Proximity for this problem, with query and communica-
tion complexities ˜ O(1/ε), and logarithmically many rounds.
This protocol can be used by a sublinear-time veriﬁer, with
the help of a more powerful prover, to approximate the Ham-
ming weight of a given vector to within distance ε. In par-
ticular, it can also be used to prove that the (approximate)
majority of bits in a boolean vector are 1 (where the ap-
proximation is up to fractional additive error ε). Here too,
there is a provable improvement on what can be obtained
without a prover: by sampling lower bounds, approximat-
ing the Hamming weight to within additive fractional error
ε requires Ω(1/ε
2) queries. We note that, similarly to re-
mark 1.2, Ω(1/ε) queries are necessary, and so this result is
essentially tight. See the full version for details.
1.2 The Limits of IPP
We prove lower bounds on the tradeoﬀs between query
complexity, communication complexity, and round complex-
ity, showing that constant-round interactive proofs of prox-
imity must have query or communication complexity polyno-
mially related to n. Speciﬁcally, we exhibit a uniform NC
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language Ln ⊆ {0,1}
n (in fact an F2-linear subspace) for
which any O(1)-round interactive proof of (1/8)-proximity
with communication complexity c(n) and query complexity
q(n) must have max{c(n),q(n)} = n
Ω(1/r(n)). So achieving
polynomially small complexity (as we do) is the best we can
hope for in bounded-round protocols. (It remains an intrigu-
ing open problem whether using many rounds, polylogarith-
mic communication and query complexity is possible.)
To prove our lower bound, we ﬁrst use standard transfor-
mations of interactive proofs [GS86, BM88] to convert any
bounded-round, private-coin IPP into an “AM-type” IPP
with related complexity. By an “AM-type” IPP, we mean a
2-message public-coin protocol, where the veriﬁer sends its
coin tosses to the prover, receives a message from the prover,
and then deterministically queries its input oracle and de-cides whether to accept or reject. For AM-type protocols,
we obtain a lower bound of max{c(n),q(n)} = ˜ Ω(
√
n) by
using a novel connection with pseudorandomness for CNF
formulas. Speciﬁcally, we show that the maximum accep-
tance probability of the veriﬁer in an AM-type IPP protocol
can be computed as the probability that the input x satisﬁes
a random CNF formula of size at most 2
c(n)+q(n) chosen ac-
cording to the following distribution: choose the coins v of
the veriﬁer at random, and then consider the CNF formula
that takes an OR over the 2
c(n) possible prover messages p
and checks whether the input x yields any of the ≤ 2
q(n) ac-
cepting sequences of responses to the veriﬁer’s oracle queries.
Thus, we can take our language Ln to be the image of a
pseudorandom generator for CNF formulas of size 2
c(n)+q(n)
with seed length O((c(n)+q(n))
2 logn), e.g. as constructed
in [Nis91, Baz09]. The protocol will have roughly the same
acceptance probability on a random element of Ln as it does
on a uniformly random string, which will be far from Ln with
high probability unless max{c(n),q(n)} = ˜ Ω(
√
n) (since oth-
erwise Ln has exponentially small support). See Section 4
for further details.
1.3 Further Remarks and Related Work
Related Work on Interactive Proofs. Interactive Proofs
were introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoﬀ [GMR89],
and independently by Babai and Moran [BM88]. A long line
of research has considered various restrictions on the veriﬁer
in an interactive proof (see the full version), but the running
time of the veriﬁers in these works is at least linear in the
input length.
In terms of the running time of the honest prover, we fol-
low [GKR08] in focusing on polynomial-time honest provers,
and on interactive proofs for tractable languages. All of our
protocols for speciﬁc languages have eﬃcient honest provers.
The general result of Theorem 1.1 applies to every lan-
guage that is computable in low-depth (even with super-
polynomial size circuits), but we emphasize that the honest
prover running time in that protocol is polynomial in the
circuit size. If the circuit is polynomial size, then the honest
prover runs in polynomial time.
Computationally Sound Proof Systems. We note that
under cryptographic assumptions, if we only require security
against polynomial-time cheating provers, then even more
powerful general results are possible (see below). In con-
trast, all of our protocols are unconditionally secure, and
make no assumptions about the power of a cheating prover.
We further remark that our negative results show a provable
separation between what can be obtained by uncondition-
ally sound versus computationally sound protocols (under
cryptographic assumptions).
We brieﬂy elaborate on computationally sound interac-
tive proofs of proximity. These can be obtained by combin-
ing PCPs of Proximity (or Assignment Testers) [BGH
+06,
DR06], with the techniques of Kilian and Micali [Kil88,
Mic94] for ensuring non-adaptive behavior of the (polynomial-
time) cheating prover. The idea is for the prover to construct
a PCP of Proximity, and then Merkle-hash it down to a short
string that is sent to the veriﬁer. The Merkle hash forces
non-adaptive behavior later, when the prover answers the
veriﬁer’s queries. These techniques require assuming a fam-
ily of collision-resistant hash functions (CRHs). The end
result is a 2-round computationally sound interactive proof
of ε-proximity for any language in EXP. The prover’s run-
ning time is polynomial in the running time needed to decide
the language, the veriﬁer’s running time is polylogarithmic
in this running time (and polynomial in the security param-
eter). The query complexity is (1/ε) · polylog(n), and the
communication complexity is polylogarithmic in n and poly-
nomial in the security parameter. Micali’s construction can
be used to further reduce the round complexity to a single
round in the random oracle model.
2. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Notation. For a ﬁnite ﬁeld F and a vector ⃗ x ∈ Σ
n, we use
|⃗ x| to denote the length of ⃗ x. We use ⃗ x[i] to refer to the i-th
element of ⃗ x. For a subset I ⊆ [n], ⃗ x|I ∈ F
|I| is the projec-
tion of ⃗ x onto coordinates in I. The (absolute) Hamming
weight ∥⃗ x∥ is the number of non-zero coordinates in ⃗ x. For
two vectors ⃗ x,⃗ y of the same length, the (fractional) Ham-
ming distance between ⃗ x,⃗ y ∈ F
n, which we denote ∆(⃗ x,⃗ y),
is the fraction of coordinates on which ⃗ x and ⃗ y disagree
(∥⃗ x − ⃗ y∥/n). We sometimes refer to the absolute Hamming
distance ∆absolute(⃗ x,⃗ y) = ∆(⃗ x,⃗ y)·n. Throughout this work,
when we refer to Hamming distance we mean fractional dis-
tance unless we explicitly note otherwise.
For a matrix X ∈ F
k×ℓ, and (i,j) ∈ [k] × [ℓ], we use
X[i][j] to refer to the item in the i-th row and j-th column
of X. We use X[i,∗] ∈ F
ℓ to refer to the i-th row, and
X[∗,j] ∈ F
k to refer to the j-th column. For a subset of
coordinates I ⊆ [k] × [ℓ], we use X|I to denote the vector
of X’s values in coordinates in I (in lexicographic order).
We deﬁne |X|, ∥X∥, and the Hamming distance between
matrices analogously to vectors.
In several places throughout this work, we view vectors as
matrices. For ⃗ x ∈ F
n, we specify k and ℓ such that n = k·ℓ,
and associate every coordinate in [n] with a pair (i,j) ∈
[k] × [ℓ] in the natural way. We view ⃗ x as a matrix X ∈
F
k×ℓ, where every element of ⃗ x is mapped to the appropriate
coordinate in X.
Interactive Proofs of Proximity. These are protocols
used for verifying that an input is close to a language L.
The goal is achieving this with a veriﬁer that runs in sublin-
ear time, without even reading the input in its entirety. The
input to the proof system is shared by the prover and the
veriﬁer. For greater generality, as in [BGH
+06], we divide
the input into an implicit or oracle part x, and an explicit
part w. The prover gets (x,w) as a (standard) input. The
veriﬁer gets n = |x| (O(logn) bits) and w as a standard
input, and gets oracle access to x. For a language L over
pairs (x,w), we refer to the language L(w) = {x : (x,w) ∈
L}. For example, the PVAL language has an explicit input
(F,k,m,J,⃗ v), where F is a ﬁnite ﬁeld, k an individual de-
gree bound, m a number of variables, J a set of evaluation
coordinates, and ⃗ v a vector of values. The implicit input x
is the description of a multivariate polynomial px. An input
(x,(F,k,m,J,⃗ v)) is in PVAL if px and ⃗ v agree on the evalu-
ation points in J. Alternatively, x is in PVAL(F,k,m,J,⃗ v)
iﬀ (x,(F,k,m,J,⃗ v)) ∈ PVAL.
Definition 2.1 (Interactive Proof of Proximity (IPP)).
For a language L over alphabet Σ = Σ(n), and distance
ε = ε(n), a proof system (P,V) is an Interactive Proof of
ε-Proximity for a language L on pairs (x,w), with α = α(n)
and β = β(n) completeness and soundness errors (respec-
tively), if the following conditions hold for all x of length n
and strings w,• α-Completeness: if (x,w) ∈ L, then with all but α
probability over the coins of V, it will accept in the
protocol execution (P(x,w),V
x(n,w)).
• β-Soundness: if x is at fractional Hamming distance
ε or more from L, then for every cheating prover P
′,
with all but β probability over the coins of V, it will
reject in the protocol execution (P
′(x,w),V
x(n,w))
We call x the implicit input, and w the explicit input
(which may be empty). A public-coin protocol is one in
which the veriﬁer’s messages are simply random coin tosses.
A protocol with completeness error 0 is said to have per-
fect completeness. The query complexity q = q(n) is the
number of queries V makes into x (each query returns an
element in the alphabet Σ). The communication complexity
c = c(n) is the number of bits exchanged. The round com-
plexity r = r(n) is the number of communication rounds
(with two messages per round).
Definition 2.2 (IPP Complexity Class). The class
IPP(ε,q,c,r,v,p) includes all languages that have Interac-
tive Proofs of ε(n)-proximity, with query, communication,
and round complexities q(n), c(n), and r(n) (respectively),
where the veriﬁer running time is v(n) and the honest prover’s
running time is p(n).
For ease of notation, we also deﬁne IPP(ε,q,c,r), the
class of languages as above, where the veriﬁer’s running time
is poly(q(n),c(n),logn) and the prover’s running time is
poly(n). Finally, on occasion we refer to IPP(ε), the class
of languages as above, where the query and communication
complexities, and the veriﬁer’s running time, are all sublin-
ear in n, and the honest prover’s running time is poly(n).
3. MORE ON THE POWER OF IPP
In this section we describe our positive results on Inter-
active Proofs of Proximity for Low-Depth Languages. These
are obtained by ﬁrst identifying the complete language PVAL:
we give a reduction from proving proximity to any language
computable in low depth, to proving proximity to PVAL.
Our main technical contribution is an Interactive Proof of
Proximity for PVAL. By completeness, this protocol imme-
diately implies an Interactive Proof of Proximity for every
language computable in low depth (see Theorem 1.1 in the
introduction).
As discussed in the introduction, the implicit input X to
PVAL speciﬁes an m-variate polynomial over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F.
The language is speciﬁed by a set of points and values, and
a polynomial X is in the language if it agrees with the given
values on the given points. Equivalently, we can think of
PVAL as the language of evaluating coordinates in a Reed-
Muller encoding of the input X (a message for the code). A
message X is in the language if its encoding, projected onto
the given coordinates, agrees with the given values.
Definition 3.1 (PVAL). PVAL is a language on pairs:
X and (F,k,m,J,⃗ v), where X is the implicit input, and the
other inputs are explicit. X ∈ F
km
is the description m-
variate polynomial pX of degree at most k in each variable.
Taking [k] to be the lexicographically ﬁrst k elements of F,
X speciﬁes pX by its evaluations on all points in [k]
m (we
refer to [k]
m as the “interpolation set”). J ⊆ F
m is a set
of evaluation points, and ⃗ v ∈ F
|J| a vector of values. The
input is in PVAL if and only if the polynomial pX takes the
values speciﬁed by ⃗ v on the coordinates in J.
Equivalently, taking C
m to be an m-variate Reed-Muller
code over F (with degree parameter k in each variable), the
input is in PVAL if and only if the encoding C
m(X) takes the
values speciﬁed by ⃗ v on the coordinates in J: C
m(X)|J = ⃗ v.
We say that (X,J,⃗ v) is an instance of PVAL on (F,k,m)
or on C
m, if and only if it is the case that (X,(F,k,m,J,⃗ v)) ∈
PVAL. We say that (X,J,⃗ v) is d-far from PVAL (on (F,k,m)
or on C
m) if and only if X is d-far from PVAL(F,k,m,J,⃗ v)).
We begin with an overview of our contributions: the com-
pleteness reduction to PVAL, and the Interactive Proof of
Proximity for PVAL, highlighting the main technical contri-
butions along the way. The full details follow.
Overview: PVAL is “Complete”. We show a reduction
from proving proximity to any language L computable in
(log-space uniform) size S = S(n) and depth D = D(n) =
n
γ, to proving proximity to PVAL. This uses the “Inter-
active Proofs for Muggles” of [GKR08]. They showed an
interactive proof for any such L, where the prover runs
in time poly(S), and the round complexity, communica-
tion complexity, and veriﬁer running time are all polyno-
mial in D. That Interactive Proof, when run on an input
X ∈ {0,1}
n, outputs a claim about an encoding of X at a
uniformly random coordinate j. The encoding is performed
using an m-variate Reed-Muller code C
m. The protocol’s
output is a pair (j,v), specifying the claim C
m(X)[j] = v.
Completeness means that, when X ∈ L and the prover hon-
estly follows the protocol, the claim speciﬁed by (j,v) is
indeed true. Soundness means that, for X / ∈ L, for any
cheating prover strategy, with probability at least 1/2 over
the veriﬁer’s coins, the claim speciﬁed by (j,v) is false, i.e.
C
m(X)[j] ̸= v.
Our reduction runs the GKR interactive proof t times in
parallel. This yields t pairs of the form (j,v), which we ag-
gregate into a collection J of coordinates in C
m(X), and
a vector ⃗ v of claimed values for those coordinates. Com-
pleteness means that, when X ∈ L and the prover honestly
follows the protocol, the claim speciﬁed by (J,⃗ v) is true, i.e.
C
m(X)|J = ⃗ v. Soundness means that when X / ∈ L, for any
cheating prover strategy, w.h.p. the claim speciﬁed by (J,⃗ v)
is false, i.e. C
m(X)|J ̸= ⃗ v. On closer inspection, soundness
actually implies a stronger property: If X is at (fractional)
Hamming distance ε from L, where t ≥ 2ε·n·logn from L,
then w.h.p. over the veriﬁer’s coins, C
m(X
′)|J ̸= ⃗ v for all X
′
at distance less than ε from X (simultaneously). To see this,
observe that every X
′ at distance less than ε from X is also
not in L (because X is ε-far from L). By soundness of each
invocation of the GKR protocol, with probability at least
1/2, the claim on X
′ speciﬁed by that invocation’s output is
false, i.e. C
m(X
′)[j] ̸= v. The probability that, over t inde-
pendent parallel runs of the GKR protocol, C
m(X
′)|J = ⃗ v is
at most 2
−t ≤ n
−2ε·n. The number of inputs at (fractional)
distance less than ε from X is at most n
ε·n. Taking a Union
Bound over all inputs X
′ at distance less than ε from X, we
get that w.h.p. there exists no such X
′ for which the claim
speciﬁed by (J,⃗ v) is true.
We conclude that there is a reduction from any language
L ∈ Depth(n
γ) to PVAL on the code C
m used by the GKR
protocol. We note that the reduction speciﬁes an instance
X for PVAL(J,⃗ v), where |J| = O(ε · n · logn). In our use
of the GKR veriﬁer, it sees J and ⃗ v, but never accessesthe input X.
8 The completeness of PVAL motivates our
main contribution: an Interactive Proof of Proximity for this
problem (and through it, for any language in Depth(n
γ)).
Overview: Interactive Proof of Proximity for PVAL.
As discussed above, the diﬃculty in proving proximity to
PVAL, is that each coordinate in the encoding C
m(X) may
well depend on most (if not all) of X’s coordinates. The
veriﬁer cannot (on his own) verify any of the prover’s claims
about coordinates in C(X) without reading Ω(n) coordi-
nates of X. Indeed, we do note know how to directly build
an Interactive Proof of Proximity for verifying the values of
an arbitrary code C
m in a speciﬁed set of coordinates.
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Luckily, C
m is not an arbitrary code: it is a Reed-Muller
code, which (among its many useful properties) is a Linear
Tensor Code (see the full version for background on Tensor
codes). This is the main structural property of PVAL that
we will exploit. More generally, we will deﬁne the language
TVAL for evaluating any tensor code C
m of a linear code
C. Analogously to PVAL, TVAL (on C
m) is speciﬁed by a
set of codeword coordinates J and values ⃗ v. A message X
is in TVAL if C
m(X)|J = ⃗ v (see the full version for details).
Our main result in this section is an Interactive Proof
of Proximity for TVAL on any tensor of a linear code. In
particular, this immediately gives an interactive proof for
PVAL (which is TVAL on a Reed-Muller code). The full
theorem statement and proof are in the full version. This
theorem gives a tradeoﬀ between the number of messages
exchanged and the communication complexity. Rather than
give the more general statement, we focus for now on the
two corollaries outlined in the introduction. We consider
the case |J| = O(ε · n · logn) (as in instances produced by
the reduction from Depth(n
γ) to PVAL).
Corollary 3.2. For any n ∈ N and ε ∈ (0,1], take k = √
1/ε and m = logk n. For any linear code C : F
k → F
ℓ,
where ℓ = poly(k), |F| = polylog(n). There exists an Inter-
active Proof of ε-Proximity for TVAL on C
m, with perfect
completeness, soundness 1/2, query complexity (ε)
1+o(1) and
3 messages. For |J| = O(ε · n · logn), the communication
complexity is (n ·
√
ε) · (1/ε)
o(1), and the veriﬁer runtime
is ((1/ε) + (n ·
√
ε))
1+o(1). The honest prover runtime is
poly(n).
Corollary 3.3. For any n ∈ N and ε ∈ (0,1], take
k = logn and m = logk n. For any linear code C : F
k → F
ℓ,
where ℓ = poly(k), |F| = polylog(n), there exists an Inter-
active Proof of ε-Proximity for TVAL on C
m, with perfect
completeness, soundness 1/2, query complexity (1/ε)
1+o(1),
and O(log(1/ε)/loglogn) messages. For |J| = O(ε·n·logn),
the communication complexity is ε·n·(1/ε)
o(1), and the ver-
iﬁer runtime is ((1/ε) + (ε · n))
1+o(1). The honest prover
runtime is poly(n).
Protocol Intuition. We highlight some of the main ideas
from this protocol, see also the discussion in the introduction
(further details are in the full version). We begin with some
8In its original setting, the GKR veriﬁer runs an additional
test to check that the prover’s claim about the input en-
coding in true. This requires (quasi)-linear time, and so we
avoid this step.
9We can use our general results to obtain an Interactive
Proof of Proximity to verify the values of any code C whose
encoding can be computed in low depth.
high-level background. Let F be a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Let C :
F
k → F
ℓ be a linear code (where ℓ = poly(k)). The (linear)
Tensor Code C
2 : F
k2
→ F
ℓ2
is obtained by treating the
input message as a matrix X ∈ F
k×k, encoding each of X’s
k rows using the base code C, and then encoding each of
the ℓ resulting columns using C. This yields a codeword
C
2(X) ∈ F
ℓ×ℓ, which we also view as a matrix. We will
use the code C
2 for our high level overview here. More
generally, the m-th tensor C
m is obtained by treating the
input message as a matrix X ∈ F
k×km 1
, encoding each
of X’s k rows using the (m − 1)-th tensor C
m−1, and then
encoding each of the resulting ℓ
m−1 columns using C (see
the full version for details).
The Interactive Proof of Proximity, on input X, should ac-
cept if C
2(X)|J = ⃗ v, and reject if X is at Hamming distance
at least ε from every X
′ s.t. C
2(X
′)|J = ⃗ v. For this informal
exposition, we take ε = k
1/2/n and |J| = t = O(ε·n·logn) =
˜ O(k
1/2). We use d = ε · n to denote the absolute Hamming
distance. We aim for o(k
2) query and communication com-
plexities (sublinear in the input size k
2).
Viewing C
2(X) as an ℓ × ℓ matrix, for each j ∈ J, the
(honest) prover sends to the veriﬁer the entire column of
C
2(X) that contains coordinate j. In fact, it suﬃces to
send the ﬁrst k coordinates of each such column, as the
remaining column coordinates are simply the encoding of
the ﬁrst k coordinates using the code C. Let Y ∈ F
k×|J| be
the resulting matrix (as computed by an honest prover). The
veriﬁer receives from the prover some Y
′ ∈ F
k×|J| (possibly
the prover is cheating and Y
′ ̸= Y ), and checks that Y
′ is
consistent with the values claimed in ⃗ v; namely that for each
j ∈ J, the encoding of the ﬁrst k coordinates in the column
of Y
′ that contains coordinate j, is consistent with the value
that ⃗ v gives for coordinate j.
For completeness, when Y = Y
′ and X ∈ TVAL(J,⃗ v),
the veriﬁer will accept in the above checks. When X is ε-
far from TVAL(J,⃗ v), however, the prover must “cheat” in
many of Y
′’s columns in order to avoid detection. Observe
that the i-th row of Y contains the encoding of the i-th row
of X in a coordinate set J[1].
10 Thus, from Y
′ we get k
“new”claims about the encodings of X’s rows in a subset of
coordinates. Each of these claims is an instance of TVAL
on the base code C: Using X[i,∗] and Y
′[i,∗] to denote the
i-th rows of X and Y
′ (respectively), for each i ∈ [k] we get
a new instance (X[i,∗],J[1],Y
′[i,∗]) of TVAL on C.
When the original instance X is not in TVAL(J,⃗ v) on
C
2, at least one of the k new instances will not be in TVAL
on C (because Y
′ is consistent with the values claimed in
⃗ v). Let di denote the (absolute) distance of the i-th new
instance from TVAL on C. Since the original instance is
at absolute distance d = ε · n = k
1/2 from TVAL on C
2,
we get that
∑
i∈[k] di ≥ d = k
1/2. We want the veriﬁer
to eﬃciently test the k new instances, in query complexity
that is smaller than the query complexity needed to test the
original instance. One immediate challenge is that it might
be the case that all but one of the instances are “kosher”
(i.e. in TVAL), and the prover’s cheating is concentrated in
a single instance speciﬁed by some row i
∗ ∈ [k]. The veriﬁer
doesn’t know i
∗, and so it must test the validity of all k of
the new claims. We deal with this challenge using new ideas
described below.
10For each j ∈ J, we view it as a pair (j[0],j[1]) ∈ ℓ × ℓ, and
J[1] contains the coordinate j[1].When The Prover Cheats on a Single Row. First,
assume that the prover’s cheating is concentrated in a single
row i
∗ with di = d (we discuss the more general case later).
The veriﬁer sends to the prover coeﬃcients specifying a ran-
dom linear combination ⃗ z ∈ F
k of X’s rows. The (honest)
prover sends back ⃗ x = ⃗ z · X ∈ F
k. The veriﬁer receives
some ⃗ x
′, and veriﬁes C(⃗ x
′)J (0) = ⃗ y
′ = ⃗ z · Y
′ (otherwise
the veriﬁer rejects). This additional test maintains perfect
completeness, because C is a linear code. For soundness, we
consider the case where every other row i ̸= i
∗ of Y
′ contains
the correct values of the i-th row of X. W.h.p. row i
∗ will
have a non-zero coeﬃcient in the linear combination. When
this is the case, we get that (⃗ x,J
−(0),⃗ y
′) is also at absolute
distance di = d from TVAL. Thus the absolute Hamming
distance between the “real” ⃗ x, and ⃗ x
′ sent by the cheating
prover, is at least d (since (⃗ x
′,J
−(0),⃗ y
′) ∈ TVAL).
To guarantee soundness, the veriﬁer now checks a few ran-
domly chosen coordinates of ⃗ x
′, to see that it is close to the
“real”⃗ x. If the prover is cheating, then the (absolute) Ham-
ming distance between ⃗ x and ⃗ x
′ is at least d, so it suﬃces to
check O(k/d) = O(k
1/2) coordinates of ⃗ x
′. Each coordinate
in ⃗ x is a linear combination of k coordinates in X, and so
the total query complexity is O(k
3/2). The communication
complexity is ˜ O(k
3/2) for sending Y
′ (sending ⃗ z and ⃗ x
′ takes
only O(k) bits of communication).
When The Prover Cheats on Many Rows. More gen-
erally, the prover’s cheating might be spread over many (or
all) rows. We show that there always exists a set I of rows,
such that ∀i ∈ I,di = ˜ Ω(d/|I|). We saw above, that when
the cheating is all on one row (|I|=1), then w.h.p. a ran-
dom linear combination that contains this row speciﬁes an
instance that is at distance Ω(d) from TVAL on C. In fact,
this is but an example of a more general (and more pow-
erful) phenomenon; We show that, with high probability, a
random linear combination ⃗ z of the rows, which contains
one or more of the rows in the set I, speciﬁes an instance
of distance ˜ Ω(d/|I|). This result follows from a new lemma
about distances between linear subspaces, which may be of
independent interest (see Lemma 1.6 in the introduction).
With this new insight in mind, suppose that the veriﬁer
knows |I| (but doesn’t know which rows are in I). The ver-
iﬁer takes a random linear combination of O(k/|I|) rows.
W.h.p. the linear combination will include at least one row
of I, and by the above it will specify an instance of distance
˜ Ω(d/|I|). There is a tradeoﬀ here: the larger I is, the smaller
the distance of the resulting instance, but the “locality” of
⃗ x is reduced: each bit of ⃗ x depends on only O(k/|I|) bits
of the original input X. When the cheating prover sends
⃗ x
′, we now know that ∆absolute(⃗ x,⃗ x
′) = ˜ Ω(d/|I|). After re-
ceiving ⃗ x
′, the veriﬁer can test ˜ O(k/(d/|I|)) = ˜ O(|I| · k/d)
random coordinates, and w.h.p the prover’s cheating will be
caught. Testing each coordinate requires O(k/|I|) queries
to the input X, and so the total query complexity remains
˜ O(k
2/d) = ˜ O(k
3/2), regardless of |I|.
The above assumed that the veriﬁer knows |I|. In reality,
the veriﬁer doesn’t know what |I| is, but it can (approxi-
mately) cover all possibilities by running log k instantiations
of the protocol, and trying all possible powers of 2. This
blows up the query and communication complexities by a
logk factor, giving a complete and sound sublinear protocol
for TVAL on Tensor codes C
2. The query and communica-
tion complexities are ˜ O(k
3/2) = ˜ O(n
3/4).
Composing Tensor Reductions. More generally, the
above protocol for TVAL can be used to provide a reduc-
tion from testing TVAL on a linear tensor code C1 ⊗ C2, to
testing (logk instances of) TVAL on the C2. We thus call
it the “Tensor Reduction” protocol. (see the full version)
Starting with an instance of TVAL for a high-power Ten-
sor code C
m, we can use C
m = C ⊗ C
m−1, and repeatedly
compose the Tensor Reduction Protocol, reducing the ten-
sor power more and more. This improves the communication
complexity (but increases the number of rounds).
4. LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we prove lower bounds on the tradeoﬀ
between query complexity, communication complexity, and
round complexity for interactive proofs of proximity:
Theorem 4.1. There is a language L in logspace-uniform
NC
1 such that in any interactive proof of (1/8)-proximity
for L with prover-to-veriﬁer communication c(n), veriﬁer
query complexity q(n), and r(n) veriﬁer messages (where the
veriﬁer messages are uniformly random strings, and veriﬁer
has no additional randomization), we have
min{r(n),c(n),q(n)} = n
Ω(1/r(n)).
In particular, it is impossible to have r(n) = O(1) and
c(n) = q(n) = n
o(1).
Moreover, for every length n, L∩{0,1}
n is an F2 subspace
of {0,1}
n for which a basis can be constructed in logspace-
uniform NC.
For lack of space, the proofs are omitted. See the full ver-
sion. We begin by proving a lower bound for an “AM ana-
logue of IPP”(which we denote AM-IPP), where on input
length n, the veriﬁer sends its random coins v
R ←{0,1}
t(n) to
the prover, the prover replies with a message p ∈ {0,1}
c(n),
and then the veriﬁer makes q(n) queries to the input oracle
x ∈ {0,1}
n (depending on n, v and p) and then accepts or
rejects (based on v, p, and the oracle responses).
Our lower bound is based on the observation that the
maximum acceptance probability of the veriﬁer in such a
protocol can be computed by a “small” CNF formula.
Lemma 4.2. Let V be a veriﬁer in an AM-IPP protocol
where on inputs of length n, the prover’s message has length
c(n) and the veriﬁer makes q(n) queries to its input oracle
x ∈ {0,1}
n. Let AccV (x) denote the maximum, over all
prover strategies P
∗, that the veriﬁer V accepts on input x.
Then for every input length n, there is a distribution D on
CNF formulas with at most 2
c(n)+q(n) clauses of width at
most q(n) such that AccV (x) = E
φ
R ←D [φ(x)].
Given that the veriﬁer’s acceptance probability is com-
puted by (distributions over) CNF formulas, we can use a
pseudorandom generator for CNF formulas to obtain a lan-
guage for which it is hard to prove proximity.
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Lemma 4.3. Let V be a veriﬁer in an interactive protocol,
and AccV (x) be the maximum probability, over all prover
strategies P
∗, that the V accepts on input x. Suppose Gn :
11This has the ﬂavor of results in proof complexity, where for
certain proof systems it is hard to certify that a given string
is outside the image of an appropriate PRG [ABSRW04].{0,1}
n/8 → {0,1}
n be a generator that fools AccV in the
sense that
E[AccV (Gn(Un/8))] − E[AccV (Un)] < 1/8.
Then V cannot be a veriﬁer in an interactive proof of n/8-
proximity for Image(Gn).
We can now use known explicit pseudorandom generators
that fool CNF formulas, such as [Nis91, Baz09], to obtain
languages that have no low-complexity AM-IPP protocol.
Lemma 4.4. For every n, there is an explicit generator
Gn : {0,1}
n/8 → {0,1}
n such that
1. For every CNF formula φ on n variables with at most
m(n) clauses, for m(n) = 2
−Ω(
√
n/ log n), we have:
|E[AccV (Gn(Un/8))] − E[AccV (Un)]| < 2
−Ω(
√
n/ log n)
2. Gn is an F2-linear map, and the n × n/8 matrix for
evaluating Gn can be constructed in logspace-uniform
NC.
Theorem 4.5. There is a language L in logspace-uniform
NC that has no AM-IPP proof of (1/8)-proximity in which
the prover’s message has length o(
√
n/logn) and the veri-
ﬁer’s query complexity is o(
√
n/logn). Moreover, for every
length n, L ∩ {0,1}
n is an F2 subspace of {0,1}
n for which
a basis can be constructed in logspace-uniform NC.
Now, to handle protocols with more rounds and private
coins, we use classic transformations to convert the protocols
to AM protocols, keeping track of the eﬀect of the trans-
formations on the communication complexity and the query
complexity. The ﬁrst transformation collapses any r-round
public-coin interactive proof to an AM proof system, with a
complexity blow-up that is exponential in r. This is a more
quantitative version of the AM Collapse Theorem of Babai
and Moran [BM88], as worked out in [GVW02]. See the full
version for details.
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